The Effects of Financial Aid and Returns Information in Selective and Less Selective Schools : Experimental Evidence from Chile by Busso, Matías et al.
The Effects of Financial Aid and Returns 
Information in Selective and Less Selective 
Schools: 
Experimental Evidence from Chile
Matías Busso    
Taryn Dinkelman       
Claudia Martínez A.          
Dario Romero             
IDB WORKING PAPER SERIES Nº IDB-WP-743
November 2016
Department of Research and Chief Economist
Inter-American Development Bank
November 2016
The Effects of Financial Aid and Returns Information 
in Selective and Less Selective Schools: 
Experimental Evidence from Chile
Matías Busso* 
Taryn Dinkelman** 
Claudia Martínez A.*** 
Dario Romero**** 
* Inter-American Development Bank 
** Dartmouth College, NBER, BREAD, and Centre for Economic Policy Research 
*** Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile and Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) 
**** Columbia University
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the 
Inter-American Development Bank 
Felipe Herrera Library 
 
The effects of financial aid and returns information in selective and less selective 
schools: experimental evidence from Chile / Matías Busso, Taryn Dinkelman, Claudia 
Martínez A., Dario Romero. 
     p. cm. — (IDB Working Paper Series ; 743) 
     Includes bibliographic references. 
     1. Education, Higher-Economic aspects-Chile. 2. Student aid-Chile. I. Busso, 
Matías. II. Dinkelman, Taryn. III. Martínez A., Claudia. IV. Romero, Dario. V. Inter-
American Development Bank. Department of Research and Chief Economist. VI. 
Series. 
IDB-WP-743  
 
Copyright ©              Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/
legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose, as provided below. No 
derivative work is allowed. 
 Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to 
the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be 
subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. 
 Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised 
version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic 
Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, 
the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such 
restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license 
and these statements, the latter shall prevail. 
Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license. 
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American 
Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. 
 
http://www.iadb.org
2016
1 
 
Abstract1 
 
Schools that provide higher education often belong to either a merit-based 
selective system or an open-access less selective system. This paper presents the 
results of a field experiment that provided Grade 12 students in Chile with 
tailored information about financial aid and average earnings and employment 
probabilities for schools and careers in both types of schools. No effect is found 
on the extensive margins of enrollment in the selective or in the less selective 
sector. Treated students change their intensive margin decisions: they choose 
careers and schools with lower expected wages and lower employment 
probabilities, but with higher quality relative to their baseline preferences. 
 
Keywords: Information experiment, Higher education, Financial aid, Returns to 
education, Chile 
JEL classification: I23, I22, I26, D830 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the standard framework modeling human capital investments, decision-makers have complete 
and accurate information on the costs and expected benefits of each schooling level. This enables 
them to make optimal schooling choices. Increasingly, new results from the development and 
economics of education literatures are challenging this assumption. For example, Jensen (2010) 
shows that providing children with basic information on average earnings increased education of 
treated students by 0.2 years. Other randomized controlled trials have shown that providing 
information to students or parents about the benefits and/or costs of investing in higher levels of 
education improves school attendance, grades, application choices and enrollment outcomes at 
different levels of schooling.2  
Whether providing information affects human capital investments and what choices this 
information can affect may depend on context. In the case of higher education, students in many 
parts of the world encounter a two-tier structure comprised of a selective and a less selective 
system. The selective system includes a small number of schools of high and relatively 
homogeneous quality. Access to this system is merit-based, typically determined by performance 
on national tests, and usually managed through a centralized applications process.3 In contrast, 
the less selective system is often populated by a larger number of new, for-profit schools of 
heterogeneous quality. Eligibility requirements are lower in these schools, and the application 
process decentralized. The role of information in helping students to make better choices in this 
environment is arguably more important for students considering the less selective sector.4 So 
                                                 
2 These experiments have taken different forms. For example, some provide application information to interested 
students (e.g., Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013; Hoxby and Turner, 2013), others provide information on economic 
returns (Nguyen, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Hastings, Nielson and Zimmerman, 2015) or on financial aid (Dinkelman and 
Martínez A., 2014; Dunn and Oreopoulos, 2013), while yet others supplement information interventions with 
targeted assistance in applying for financial aid or college (Bettinger et al., 2012; Brown, Lavecchia and 
Oreopoulos, 2015), or with cash incentives or fee waivers for completing applications (Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013; 
Hoxby and Turner, 2013). Studies have been targeted at all levels of schooling (primary, secondary and tertiary), at 
different types of students (high achievers and more average students), and in high, middle-income and low-income 
countries such as the United States, Chile, Madagascar, and Dominican Republic. Banerjee et al. (2013) and 
Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopolous (2014) present comprehensive reviews of much of this recent experimental evidence 
from studies in developed and developing country settings. 
3 Centralized admissions procedures for entry into selective public universities can be found in Australia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Hong Kong, India (universities may participate in one of several centralized admissions systems), 
Ireland, Nigeria, Norway, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Similar systems exist for admission to prestigious 
public secondary schools in Kenya, Ghana, Malawi and Nigeria. In most of these countries, performance on a high-
stakes qualifying exam, like the SAT in the United States, is an important determinant of placement.  
4 Reyes et al. (2013) discuss issues surrounding lack of information in postsecondary schooling in Chile, where the 
less selective sector has recently expanded.  
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far, however, the literature has either focused on information interventions targeted at schools in 
the selective system (e.g., Hoxby and Turner, 2013) or does not differentiate between access to 
selective and less selective sectors (e.g., Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2015).5 
In this paper, we describe the results of a randomized field experiment conducted with 
Grade 12 students in Chile that we designed to explore the effects of giving students tailored 
information on financial aid and economic returns in a context where selective and less selective 
systems of higher education coexist. Specifically, we tailored our information treatments to 
student preferences for careers and schools, collected at baseline. We measure the impacts of the 
treatments on the extensive margin of enrollment in each of the selective and less selective 
sectors and on the intensive margin of school choice, conditional on enrollment. 
There are three distinguishing features of our study. First, we designed the intervention to 
be inexpensive and scalable: treated students receive information treatments by email at the time 
of the intervention, which coincides with the process of applications to post-secondary school 
and to financial aid for higher education. Several important studies analyze how information 
about higher education affects decisions in the United States and find large positive effects on 
extensive margin outcomes of enrollment. However, these information treatments tend to be 
coupled with more expensive subsidies and/or guidance through the application process (e.g., 
Bettinger et al., 2012; Carrell and Sacerdote, 2013; and Hoxby and Turner, 2013). In contrast, 
our intervention involves only information.  
Second, since preferences about careers and schools may significantly constrain student 
choices about where to enroll, our intervention accounts for preferences by providing students 
with tailored information. This differs from most of the literature, in which more general, 
aggregate information is provided.6 We elicit student preferences regarding careers and schools 
at baseline. Then we provide them with information about financial aid, potential average wage 
returns, and expected employability for their specific preferred career-school combination as 
well as for alternative schools that offer the same or similar career paths.  
Third, we provide students with information about career and school options in both the 
selective and less selective sectors. Our treatments include information on elite universities in the 
                                                 
5 Kerr et al. (201r) find no impacts of an information intervention on applications or enrollment in the highly 
centralized system of higher education in Finland. They argue that information interventions may have little impact 
when preferences for specific careers have high consumption value, or when popular careers are heavily 
oversubscribed, as in the Finnish context. 
6 Recent exceptions are Hoxby and Turner (2013) and Hastings, Nielson and Zimmerman (2015). 
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selective system and information regarding less selective universities, professional schools and 
technical/vocational colleges. We show that because there is substantial sorting of students 
across the selective and the less selective sectors based on college entry exam scores, 
information treatments have less room to—and in fact do not—impact access to the selective 
sector. Whether information treatments have larger impacts for students who are excluded from 
the selective school system is an empirical question, which we are also able to address. 
Our first result is that delivering tailored information via email was a feasible and 
inexpensive method of reaching out to students at the time they were managing the transition to 
higher education. The downside of this delivery mechanism was low uptake. At most, half of the 
students received and opened our treatment emails. As a result, our study is underpowered to 
detect small impacts for many outcomes. 
Turning to impacts, we find no evidence that exposure to tailored financial aid 
information affected applications to or enrollment in schools in the selective system.7 This allows 
us to assess the impact of our treatments on the extensive and intensive margins of choice in the 
less selective sector, without concerns about sample selection. In the subsample of students not 
enrolling in any selective school, we find no statistically significant impacts of any information 
treatments on extensive margin choices about enrollment in the less selective schools. These 
extensive margin estimates are noisy, but small relative to control group means.   
We do find that exposure to financial aid and returns information affects intensive margin 
decisions in the less selective sector, for the subsample of students choosing to enroll in the less 
selective sector. We show that our treatment nudges students to enroll in schools suggested in the 
treatment emails, and to enroll in suggested schools of a quality higher than their baseline 
preferences. Treated students switch away from for-profit universities and towards professional 
institutes. They enroll in schools with lower average expected wages and lower expected 
employment probabilities, but offering shorter degree programs at lower tuition cost (although 
these last impacts are not estimated precisely). Using college entry exam scores as a proxy for 
the baseline level of information a student has about expected returns, we show that our 
                                                 
7 Because of the timing of the intervention, we cannot estimate the impacts of exposure to the returns information on 
extensive margin choices in the selective sector. We discuss this issue in detail in Section 3.2. 
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information treatment changed the school choices of the lowest-scoring (most misinformed) 
students the most.8  
Our results on the lack of impacts on access to the selective sector are in line with results 
from a recent study by Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015) who analyze the impacts of a 
similar information experiment in a sample of higher education loan applicants in Chile. In that 
study, loan applicants receive information via email and the web about returns (expected wages 
and tuition) to different programs of study at different schools, according to their baseline 
preferences. Similar to our estimates but in a different sample, they find that their treatment has 
no impacts on the extensive margin of enrollment in higher education overall and small positive 
impacts on their calculations of expected net value from enrolling in a program of higher 
education. Our study is complementary to theirs in highlighting the feasibility, and relevance, of 
providing tailored information to students seeking to enter higher education. 
 Our results have two broad implications. First, although we demonstrate that it is 
possible to scale up even highly tailored information interventions at low cost, such interventions 
are likely to have small effects on access to selective schools when the process for applying to 
these universities is well-known, centralized, and coordinated as is the case in Chile. If the 
selective system is already over-subscribed by the best students—those with the highest entry-
level test scores and high school grades—there is little room for affecting the distribution of slots 
across students using an information intervention at the end of high school. Information at this 
point is unlikely to level the playing field for lower-scoring students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds. Moreover, information interventions of this type are also unlikely to have large 
impacts on access to the less selective school system. 
The second more novel implication of our results is that governments may still have a 
role to play in changing the allocation of students to schools in the less selective system by 
providing inexpensive and targeted information on the costs and benefits of post-secondary 
schooling. Such information will be relevant for the majority of students who do not gain access 
to the most selective schools and who must decide where it is worthwhile to invest in tertiary 
                                                 
8 In our experimental sample, 64% of students do not report any information about an expected wage for their 
preferred career and school, and those who do report an expected wage overestimate wages by an average 24%. The 
correlation between college entry exam score and item nonresponse on the expected wage question is -0.17 and the 
correlation between entry exam score and expected wage response is -0.3.  
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education. It is also likely to be important in any educational system in which the number of for-
profit schools has recently expanded and where information about their quality is limited.  
Section 2 provides some background on the higher education sector in Chile, 
distinguishing between the selective and less selective systems, while Section 3 describes the 
details of our experiment. Section 4 describes our data, Section 5 outlines the empirical strategy 
and Section 6 presents the main results. Section 7 discusses the results and the costs of the 
intervention, and concludes. 
 
2. Post-Secondary Schooling in Chile 
 
There are three main types of post-secondary institutions in Chile: universities (public, private, 
and public-private) that offer traditional five-year degree programs, professional institutes that 
offer some traditional and some technical degrees, and technical/vocational training colleges that 
focus on shorter, two to three-year programs with technical training. Graduating high school 
seniors apply to a specific career in a specific school, for example, engineering at the University 
of Chile or mechanics at a technical college.9 The most prestigious institutions are part of the 
selective school system, while other schools are less selective in regard to applicants.  
The selective school system consists of about 33 schools, including the oldest, traditional 
public universities, and some universities with private and combined public-private funding. To 
enroll in one of these schools, students must apply to and be accepted by the centralized DEMRE 
(Departamento de Evaluación, Medición y Registro Educacional) system at the end of their final 
year in high school. DEMRE (selective) schools are considered selective because eligible 
students typically need to have high GPA scores during high school and high minimum scores on 
the college entry examination (the Prueba de Selección Universitaria, PSU, which is like the 
SAT for U.S. students).10 Schools in this system are oversubscribed: in 2014, there were 1.25 
applications for each available slot (DEMRE, 2015).  
                                                 
9 Specialization occurs early in Chile, where schools admit students to specific degree programs for a specific career 
and where switching careers later on is almost impossible. This implies considerable “lock in” for enrollment 
decisions. 
10 The PSU is offered once per year in December and is free for students in any high school with public funding. 
Once students find out their PSU scores in late December, they have a two-day window in which to apply to their 
top six choices of selective schools through the centralized DEMRE application system. Solis (2015) describes how, 
unlike in the United States, entry to the selective tier of tertiary education in Chile depends only on high school and 
PSU scores. Extra-curriculars and other aspects of a candidate do not affect probabilities of acceptance. 
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In contrast, applications to the remaining 129 non-DEMRE (less selective) schools 
(SIES, 2014)—some private universities, the majority of professional institutes, and all technical 
colleges—are decentralized, and entry requirements are lower.  For example, PSU eligibility cut-
off scores are lower on average relative to cut-offs for schools in the selective system. In some 
less selective schools, students do not require a PSU score to gain entry.  
The quality of institutions varies both across and within the selective and less selective 
school systems. For example, the Chilean government certifies the quality of many degree 
programs and institutions by awarding them “accreditation status” from 1 (lowest quality) to 7 
(highest quality) years. Schools choose to be accredited, and only 52 percent of institutions have 
an accreditation score (SIES, 2014). On average, schools in the less selective system have lower 
accreditation scores and many of them have no accreditation score at all. However, there is a 
range in quality measures within each system. Within the selective system, accreditation scores 
range from 2 to 7, while within the less selective system, scores in accredited schools range from 
1 to 7.   
The majority of growth in enrollment in higher education in Chile since the early 1990s 
has been in this less selective sector, particularly in professional schools and private universities 
(OECD, 2012). By 2012, 27 percent of all students in higher education attended schools in the 
selective system, 33.2 percent in less selective universities, 26.2 percent in professional schools 
and 12.4 percent in less selective vocational schools. The decision to enter higher education 
through less selective institutions has therefore become much more salient among recent high 
school graduates. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how students sort across selective and less selective school 
systems based on PSU scores. The first figure shows the (kernel-smoothed) distribution of PSU 
test scores of students in our control group who applied to any selective school, and a separate 
distribution for those who choose not to apply to any selective school. There is some overlap in 
the distributions, but the figure also suggests a high degree of sorting by PSU score. Below a 
score of 400, almost nobody applies to the selective system. Above 600, almost nobody applies 
to a less selective school. This sorting continues into the enrollment stage. Figure 2 shows the 
share of control group students who enroll in any selective school (solid line), any non-selective 
school (dashed line), or who chose not to enroll in any higher education at all (dotted line) by 
PSU score. The lines cross at a score of 540. Among students with scores higher than 540, 40 
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percent or more enroll in a selective school and with scores above 600, 60 percent or more 
enroll. Less than 10 percent of students with scores of 600 or more enroll in the less selective 
system. At the other end of the score distribution, about half of students with PSU scores 
between 300 and 540 enroll in some less selective institution. Most other students scoring in this 
low range do not enroll anywhere. 
PSU scores are also important in qualifying for many forms of government aid, and for 
some types of privately provided financial aid. Scores above 475 are particularly salient, since 
they qualify a student to receive one of the two largest government loans. These loans are not 
restricted to specific programs of study and can be used for study in selective and less selective 
schools. There is good evidence that Chilean students are credit constrained; according to Solis 
(2015), in 2009 average tuition fees were almost half of median family income.11 Access to 
financial aid has expanded dramatically since the mid-2000s, and 65 percent of students 
currently use some combination of scholarships/grants and government loans for higher 
education (CASEN, 2013).12   
The top part of Figure 3 shows the timeline facing students who want to enter higher 
education. Students first apply for the major sources of general financial aid (state scholarships 
and loans) administered centrally, before writing the PSU and learning their scores. After 
learning the results of the PSU test, students may apply to selective schools, supplying a 
maximum of eight choices to the centralized selective system. This system allocates students to 
spots in career-school combinations based on their PSU and high school GPA scores; the central 
government allocates financial aid to students conditional on their PSU scores meeting eligibility 
cut-offs, their financial need and the accreditation of the institution of higher education.13 
Throughout this period, students may also apply to other sources of financial aid not allocated by 
the central government. Information about these other sources is decentralized, often down to the 
level of the school and program, and deadlines for applications are idiosyncratic.  
Students find out the outcomes of these centralized university and financial aid 
applications by early/mid-January. Students not admitted to a selective school, as well as those 
who choose not to apply to or enroll in a selective school can then choose to apply to one of the 
                                                 
11 Solis (2015) uses a regression discontinuity design to show that obtaining access to a government loan doubles 
college enrollment in Chile. 
12 The two large government-sponsored programs are the loan program (Crédito con Aval del Estado) and a 
scholarship program (Bicentenario, among others).  
13 In 2014, 89 percent of all state loans and scholarships were awarded in this first round. 
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less selective institutions. They may also choose not to enroll in any higher education after the 
end of high school. Applications to less selective institutions continue into late February when 
students also have a second chance to apply for remaining government-sponsored scholarships 
and other decentralized sources of financial aid. By early March, when the new school year 
starts, the market in each of the selective and less selective systems has mostly cleared.  
Applications to and decisions for the selective and less selective systems occur almost 
sequentially. This allows us to examine student choices in two distinct stages of their transition 
to higher education. In Stage 1, we look at choices of our entire sample during the early part of 
the admissions process that focuses on selective schools. In Stage 2, the later part of the 
admissions process, we examine subsequent decisions of students who do not enter a selective 
school on their remaining alternatives in the less selective system. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
 
3.1 Sample: Recruitment and Randomization 
 
We worked with a Chilean NGO, Por Una Carrera (PUC), to visit over 300 school career fairs 
in the greater Santiago region between July 2013 and November 2013. At the PUC booths, we 
collected over 10,000 emails from Grade 12 students, along with their preferences regarding 
post-secondary careers and institutions. Our sampling frame is more geographically targeted than 
the sampling frame used in Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015). We use relatively poor 
neighborhoods in Santiago, while they use the universe of government loan applicants. Another 
difference between our sample and theirs is that ours includes both students who will, and those 
who will not, go on to apply for government loans. We invited students to participate in our 
study by sending them a web link to our baseline survey; respondents had two weeks to complete 
the online survey.  
We stratified the sample using baseline information on gender and on whether a student’s 
parents had completed any tertiary education, or not, or had missing education information. 
Between October and December 2013, we randomized students into an information treatment 
and control group on a rolling basis, following a re-randomization protocol to maintain 
cumulative balance in the combined sample.14 All treated students received the financial aid 
                                                 
14 The re-randomization procedure followed Morgan and Rubin (2012). We re-randomized to achieve baseline 
balance on a set of covariates that included student characteristics in Panel A of Table 3, information on student 
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treatment: information on financial aid possibilities tailored to their baseline career-school 
preferences. Half of the treated students also received a returns treatment: information on 
expected returns related to their baseline preferences.15  
 
3.2 Description of Treatments and Timeline of Intervention 
 
We sent our emails close to the time of decision-making (November-February). This was to 
ensure that students had given some thought to their desired program of study, and to prevent the 
loss of too much information between the time of the treatment and the time of actual choices.16 
Control group: The control group received one email inviting them to learn about 
possible careers at www.eligecarrera.cl. This publicly accessible official website contains 
general information on types of careers, loans and scholarships available at different schools, 
eligibility criteria for these programs and financing options. Students in the treatment group also 
received a link to the same website in their treatment emails.17 
Financial aid treatment: All treatment students received information about how to access 
general types of financial aid offered through the centrally administered public loan and 
scholarship programs. The distinguishing feature of our financial aid treatment was that every 
student also received personalized information about alternative specific financial aid 
opportunities linked to their baseline preferences or background characteristics. They received 
information about specific scholarships or loans offered by private schools or firms, by certain 
municipalities, and by specific programs and career tracks within certain schools. Because these 
alternative types of financial aid are not centrally administered, it is typically more costly to learn 
about them. Our financial aid treatment sought to reduce this learning cost. Volunteers searched 
                                                                                                                                                             
academic performance listed in Panel B of Table 3, expected wage, expected probability of employment and 
expected probability of getting a scholarship. We used a simple Euclidean distance function to map the differences 
between treated and control means across covariates and across treatment arms to a scalar. We selected the pseudo-
random number generator seed (from a set of 10,000 randomly generated seeds) that minimized that distance 
function. 
15 We did not have a sufficiently large sample to implement a pure returns-only treatment. 
16 Dinkelman and Martínez A. (2014) show that Grade 8 students on their own retained very little information four 
months after they viewed a DVD providing them with information about how to prepare for successful financial aid 
applications at the end of high school. In results not shown in that paper, student recall of information immediately 
after watching the DVD was significantly greater than recall four months after the treatment. 
17 The website is maintained by the Consejo Nacional de Educación. 
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for each student’s personalized information on alternative sources of loans and scholarships, and 
they provided this to them in an email.18  
Table 1 describes the types of information provided in the financial aid treatment. 
Appendix 1 presents the full the email template (in English and Spanish) designed for this 
treatment. In some cases, the information provided was specific to the preferred career, or sub-
area or area of study if no career preference was given, and relevant for multiple institutions. In 
other cases, the information was specific to an institution. Where socio-economic status or PSU 
score and high school GPA was relevant for eligibility, the PUC volunteers tailored their advice 
to these characteristics. For example: a student who had a PSU score that was not high enough to 
attend the top public institutions in Chile would not have received information on scholarships or 
loans specific to these institutions, but instead would have been given information on schools 
that were feasible targets of application given their scores.  
We administered the financial aid treatment to students in December 2013, after 
applications to the government-sponsored general loan and scholarship programs had closed and 
after writing the PSU, but before the deadlines for applying to selective and less selective schools 
and most other sources of specific financial aid. We monitored the first email from the NGO 
staff for treatment compliance, but did not monitor subsequent interactions between volunteers 
and students. We expect that the financial aid treatment could have affected student choices 
about applying to and enrolling in selective and less selective schools. It may also have affected 
the types of schools to which students apply. We examine all of these outcomes in our analyses. 
We also expect this treatment to affect their application to and receipt of non-state financial aid. 
Unfortunately, there are no centralized data available to measure these outcomes.  
Returns treatment: To construct information for the returns treatment, we gathered data 
from the publicly accessible MiFuturo database (www.MiFuturo.cl) of 2013. This database 
reports average monthly earnings and average employability rates for recent graduates of specific 
career-school programs.19  
                                                 
18 We did not design the content of the financial aid treatment emails; we designed the structure of the email, and 
relied on the expertise in the NGO to fill in the relevant cells from their database. 
19 Income and employment statistics are computed from IRS data, although it is not clear how the statistics are 
created. The MiFuturo data represent average returns rather than causal estimates of the impact of specific degree-
school combinations for marginal students as in Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman (2015). We merged MiFuturo 
with the 2012 and 2013 National Council of Education databases (CNED) to identify schools and types of 
institutions. 
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Table 2 summarizes the types of information provided to students in the returns 
treatment, given their baseline career-school preferences. The appendix presents the full text of 
the email template (in English and Spanish) for this treatment. Students received returns 
information for their specific preference and for schools in four alternative categories offering 
their same career. Up to three schools in each of the selective and less selective systems were 
listed, for each of two quality tiers.20 To define three quality tiers, we ranked schools within the 
selective and less selective systems based on their years of accreditation (high, medium, and low 
levels of accreditation). Students were given information on schools from each of the selective 
and less selective systems in the same quality tercile as their baseline preference, and in a lower 
quality tercile.21 The rationale behind providing information on lower quality tier schools relative 
to baseline preferences was that if a student did not gain access to their first choice school, they 
might be successful at a lower-quality institution. However, we did not label schools as selective 
or less selective. The email only listed a set of alternative schools along with associated average 
wages and employability data. 
Half of the students in the financial aid treatment were randomized into receiving the 
returns treatment. Because of a delay in preparing the returns treatment, the treatment was 
administered after the deadline for applications to selective schools had passed but before the 
main period of applications to less selective schools. That is, the financial aid treatment was 
delivered after students had applied to the first round of central government funding and before 
the end of applications to selective schools. The returns treatment came after applications to 
selective schools had concluded but before results were released and before the second round of 
government funding closed. Both treatments were delivered before the process of applications 
for less selective schools closed, and while applications for decentralized sources of funding was 
still ongoing.  
                                                 
20 For students without career information, we used the preferred sub-area or area at baseline to create average wage 
and employability measures for these more aggregate categories. We included information on schools chosen in the 
same way, e.g., schools offering programs in the preferred sub-area or area. For students without a preferred 
institution, we provided information on schools from the first (highest) and second (medium) quality terciles. 
21 Although we listed the schools along with their associated returns, we did not specify to which quality tier each 
school belonged. In practice, students would have been able to infer something about quality (years of accreditation) 
using the information on returns and employability along with the type of institution (university/institute/technical 
college). This strategy is similar to that of Hastings and Weinstein (2008). In that study, parents were provided with 
information about school test scores that are potentially correlated with a host of other school quality measures. 
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The returns treatment was sent via a University of Chile email account, and we had full 
control over the content of these emails. Because of the timing of the returns intervention, we 
cannot affect intensive margin choices of where to apply among those applying to selective 
schools. Moreover, because an allocation algorithm manages how students are assigned to 
schools and programs within this selective system, there is almost no flexibility for students to 
make intensive margin changes in the type of selective school in which they enroll in response to 
our information treatment. Therefore, we expect that the returns treatment may affect extensive 
margin enrollment choices into the less selective school system, and may also change intensive 
margin choices on the types of less selective schools in which students enroll.  
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 Survey Data 
 
We collected baseline survey data from 1,727 Grade 12 students between October 2013 and 
December 2013. These students responded to our initial email invitation to be part of the study 
and filled out an online survey, providing basic demographic information and confirming their 
preferences reported at career fairs regarding specific career, sub-area or area of study and 
preferred institution of study. Respondents reported on measures of their own ability (expected 
high school GPA and expected score on the PSU exam) and their expectations about access to 
finance for higher education, future earnings and future employment probabilities in their 
preferred careers. 
Appendix Table 1 compares students in our experimental sample with the larger sample 
of career fair students. Our sample students expect to achieve higher high school grades and 
scores on the PSU relative to career fair students. They are also more likely to list at least one 
selective school in a baseline preference, and significantly less likely to list at least one less 
selective school. However, they resemble the larger sample of students on most other 
dimensions—e.g., demographics, self-reported poverty score, and the distribution of preferences 
for careers.22 Appendix Table 2 compares the demographics of our experimental sample to the 
universe of PSU exam takers. Our sample is relatively more female, with lower high school 
                                                 
22 About one fifth of the sample is interested in careers in technology or social sciences, law and teaching; the rest 
are distributed across management and business (16 percent), health sciences (28 percent) and remaining categories 
like humanities, architecture, and natural sciences (13 percent).  
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GPA, and somewhat higher household income, but from similar family backgrounds as measured 
by mother and father education. 
The majority of students enter our study with “complete preferences,” meaning that they 
have a well-defined idea of what they want to study, and where. About 95 percent of the 
experimental sample provided information about a specific career preference, and 80 percent 
provided both a preferred career and preferred school, although not all students had accurate 
information (e.g., some provided a career-school preference that did not exist at a particular 
school). Most of the remaining 5 percent without any career information provided some general 
preference information (e.g., the sub-area or area of preferred study) and a minority reported that 
they had “no idea” about what to study.  
 
4.2 Administrative Data 
 
We matched our experimental sample to administrative databases using unique national 
identification numbers from the Chilean Ministry of Education. The data include PSU scores, 
applications to the selective school system and the outcome of that application at the end of 2013 
(acceptance into and enrollment in a selective school-career or not), enrollment in any less 
selective school-career, characteristics (type of institution, measures of school quality) of the 
school in which the student eventually enrolled in 2014, and receipt of government financial 
aid.23 We can also tell whether a student graduated from high school in 2013; we exclude 59 
students who failed to graduate from our final analysis sample of 1,668 students. Summary 
statistics for the administrative data outcomes are in Appendix Table 3.  
Almost everyone (1,602 students, 96 percent of the sample) took the PSU exam and, of 
those students, 879 (or 53 percent) chose to apply to at least one selective school. By March 
2014, 1,206 students were enrolled in some higher education (72 percent of the sample), with 48 
percent enrolling in selective universities, 17 percent enrolling in less selective universities, 23 
percent in professional schools and 10 percent in technical schools. Receipt of centrally allocated 
financial aid from the government is highly prevalent. Three-quarters of all enrollees have some 
form of government aid (scholarship or loan), 60 percent of enrolled students have some 
government scholarship, and 43 percent have a government-backed loan. These sources of 
financial aid are not mutually exclusive: 22 percent of enrollees have both a government-backed 
                                                 
23 Note that because the less selective school system is decentralized, we cannot measure applications to schools in 
this system; we also cannot measure receipt of one of the many sources of private scholarship and loan programs. 
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loan and a scholarship (not shown). As noted above, we have no data on the share of enrolled 
students that also receive financial aid from non-federal government sources.  
It is worth noting that the 73 percent enrollment rate in our sample is quite a bit higher 
than national enrollment rates for young adults. In 2013, the share of 18 to 20-year-olds enrolled 
in school was 46 percent (CASEN, 2013). Likewise, the share of our sample with access to 
financial aid through loans and scholarships is slightly higher than rates of access in national 
data, in which 65 percent of enrollees (ages 18 to 20) have some government loan or scholarship 
(CASEN, 2013). These higher shares make sense, given that we recruited from among the 
policy-relevant group of Grade 12 students who attended career fairs and expressed interest in 
wanting information about post-secondary schooling.  
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
 
We proceed in three steps. First, we use the full analysis sample to examine the impacts of 
exposure to the financial aid treatment relative to the control group. We focus on impacts on the 
extensive margin of applications and acceptance into, and enrollment in, selective schools. We 
estimate intent to treat effects (a1) using student-level data (i) and regressions of the following 
sort:  
 
                            Yi = a0 + a1 Fi + ki + GPAi + PSUi + ei                                                             (1) 
 
where Fi is an indicator variable equal to one if student i received the financial aid treatment at 
all, ki is a set of six stratum fixed effects for gender and level of parent education (less than 
tertiary education, some tertiary education, or missing education information), ei is an 
idiosyncratic error term and we estimate robust standard errors. We also control for baseline 
expected high school GPA score and expected PSU score, GPAi and PSUi. 
We do not find large impacts on margins related to the selective school system. That is, 
the financial aid information treatment had no statistically significant impact on who applies to, 
is accepted into, or enrolls in, a selective school. This implies suggests that our treatment does 
not affect selection into, or out of the selective school system. To proceed, we shrink our sample 
to the subset of students who do not enroll in the selective school system. We show that 
treatment and control groups in this subsample have balanced characteristics at baseline. 
In the second step, we then use this sample of students (non-enrollees in the selective 
system) to analyze the impact of the two information treatments (Fi alone, and Ri for returns plus 
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financial aid) on extensive margin choices on schools in the less selective sector. This subsample 
includes all those who choose not to apply to selective schools (about half of the full sample), 
those who are not accepted into the selective system (9.5 percent of the full sample), and those 
who choose not to enroll in selective schools conditional on acceptance (about 8.8 percent of the 
full sample). These students are overwhelmingly middle and low-PSU scoring students. 
Within this sample, we estimate (2): 
 
                               Yi = b0 + b1Fi +b2Ri + ki + GPAi + PSUi + ei                                            (2) 
 
for enrollment in less selective schools (relative to no enrollment). This enrollment variable 
summarizes the outcome of extensive margin choices in the less selective system, since 
administrative data on applications to and acceptance into less selective schools does not exist. If 
we assume that the effects of each treatment are additive, then the difference between b2 and b1 
captures the additional impact of providing only the returns information.  
In the third and final step, we investigate whether the information treatments changed the 
characteristics of the less selective schools in which students enrolled. Again, because we find no 
evidence of either treatment changing extensive margin choices into enrollment in the less 
selective sector, we restrict our analysis to the subsample of those who enroll in any less 
selective school. Again, this sample is balanced on observables at baseline. In this subsample, we 
ask whether students responded to the specific information provided in the returns treatment. 
Then, we ask whether students chose different types of schools (e.g., non-college versus college, 
programs with different wages, employability, tuition and duration) in response to the treatments. 
Our results provide insight into how information provision affects the intensive margin of school 
choice, among those constrained to select schools within the less selective sector. 
 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Baseline Characteristics and Balance 
 
Table 3 shows that the experimental treatment and control groups are balanced across a range of 
observable characteristics at baseline. For each variable, we show the control mean (and standard 
deviation), the coefficients (and standard errors) on each indicator of treatment group—financial 
aid treatment and financial aid plus returns treatment—and the sample size with non-missing 
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data.24 We estimate the coefficients of the balance regressions including stratum fixed effects (ki) 
and report robust standard errors. All variables are balanced at baseline.  
The first four columns pertain to the full sample. The average student in our sample is 
17.5 years old. Almost one in five respondents reports being in one of the bottom two quintiles 
of household income and on average, 12 percent of people are poor in the municipalities 
represented in our sample. Almost everyone expects to take the PSU exam, and one in four 
respondents spends more than four hours per week studying for the exam. Seventy-five percent 
of the sample lists at least one school from the selective system in their baseline preferences (we 
asked about first and second choice at baseline), and over 90 percent of respondents list at least 
one school from the less selective system. Students place reasonably high probabilities on getting 
state or private (59 percent) scholarships for further study, and 55 percent of students anticipate 
being able to use a loan if they do not get scholarship funding. However, almost one quarter of 
the sample has no plan about how to finance higher education without scholarship funding.  
Students come into the applications process with relatively poor information about future 
returns. Expectations on predicted future returns (wages and employment probabilities) for 
people with their preferred degree are missing for a large share of the sample, suggesting that 
students had a difficult time answering these questions. Among those who do answer these 
survey questions, 73 percent expect that graduates with their preferred degree find a job, which is 
an underestimate relative to actual employment rates among cohorts age 25-35 with any further 
education; according to CASEN (2013), the employment rate among these cohorts is 84 percent.  
At the same time, students tend to overestimate wages for people with their preferred degree. 
Three-quarters of respondents with non-missing data expect that monthly wages are over 
600,000 pesos. This is 1.6 times the median monthly wage for similarly educated young adults in 
2013.25  
Combining stated student preferences for being in the selective school system with high 
expectations regarding PSU score (the average expected score is 589; we calculate that 82 
percent of our sample overestimates their actual performance on the PSU) and high wage 
expectations, we can see this sample is optimistic about their prospects in higher education. 
                                                 
24 Appendix Table 4 shows that missing data are balanced across each of the treatment and control groups for the 
full sample. Appendix Table 5 shows the same balance regressions for the subsample of individuals who do not 
enroll in any selective schools.  
25 This median is calculated over the sample of employed adults ages 20-29, who have some level of higher 
education. The data source is the 2013 CASEN, a standard labor force survey conducted each year in Chile.  
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Other work has shown that students routinely overestimate their prospects (e.g. Bobba and 
Frisancho, 2015). 
  
6.2 Treatment Compliance and Take-Up 
 
Table 4 shows that treatment compliance was high in both treatment groups, but take-up was 
low. For each of the Control, the financial aid Only Treatment, and the financial aid plus returns 
treatment groups, we show the number [percent] of the group to whom we sent financial aid 
(first three columns) and returns (last two columns) emails. We also show the number [percent] 
of financial aid emails that did not bounce, the number [percent] that received an answer from a 
respondent, and the number [percent] of returns emails that we can verify were opened.26 
Compliance was high in each of the treatment groups. Ninety-eight percent of financial 
aid emails did not bounce, and 96 percent of the returns emails were sent out to the assigned 
respondents. In only a handful of cases (a maximum of 8 students in any one group) did non-
assigned individuals receive any treatment email. Our measures of take-up are much lower. We 
verify that 10 to 14 percent of students treated with the financial aid treatment responded to their 
PUC volunteer, as was requested in the first contact email. This measure of take-up is imperfect 
though, since it is likely that more treated students actually read their email than responded to 
their PUC volunteer.  However, even when we can verify that students received the treatment, as 
in the case of the returns treatment that we directly administered, only 53 percent of students 
opened their emails.27  
These rates of take-up clearly limit the potential impact the treatment could have on 
choices and outcomes. We report Intent to Treat (ITT) results instead of instrumenting for 
treatment using take-up rates. These estimates represent the average effects we can expect when 
scaling up these information treatments in a population of similar students. Alongside each 
                                                 
26 We worked with a programmer to develop a program that assembled, delivered, and kept track of opened and 
bounced emails. 
27 Compared with other recent experiments that evaluate the role of information and mentoring for college 
applications and enrollment in the United States, our measurable take-up rate for the financial aid treatment is lower, 
while the take-up rate for the returns treatment is on par with these other studies. For example, in Carrell and 
Sacerdote’s (2014) college application mentoring program in New Hampshire high schools, the take up rate was 
around 50 percent. Take-up in this study meant that students actually attended the offered mentoring program. 
Hoxby and Turner’s (2013) information intervention targeted at low-income, high-achieving high school graduates, 
measured take-up in a subsample of the experimental sample at 23-48 percent. In Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman 
(2015), less than 50 percent of the treatment group used the searchable information database provided in the 
intervention. 
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outcome in our main results tables, we also report minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes given 
our sample size and take-up.  
 
6.3 Effects of Information Treatments on Extensive Margin Outcomes 
 
Table 5 shows how providing financial aid information affects behavior on the extensive margin 
of entry into the selective school system. The control group mean appears in the first column, 
and the impact estimate of a1 in equation (1) is shown in the second column. We present three 
sets of outcomes: application to any selective school, acceptance into a selective school, and 
enrollment in a selective school.  
Over half of the control group applied to a selective school, and 78 percent of them were 
accepted (0.41/0.52). In the entire control group, 34 percent enrolled in a selective school, or 
about 82 percent of those accepted. The second column shows that the financial aid information 
treatment had no statistically significant impacts on any of these outcomes. The treatment effects 
are all positive, but relatively small and not statistically significantly different than zero. Low 
take-up rates in a small sample make it difficult to estimate any small effects precisely: we could 
only reject fairly large MDEs on these access variables (columns 3), given our experimental set 
up. Nonetheless, despite the specificity and targeting of the financial aid treatment to student 
preferences, we can say our information treatment does not have meaningfully large impacts on 
access to the selective school system. 
These results make sense. Selective schools are already oversubscribed and schools can 
choose from the highest PSU scorers. Students with high enough scores seem to know they are 
eligible for these schools: they apply, are accepted, and enroll. Lower-scoring students cannot 
meet the high PSU cut-off scores required for selective school eligibility, and middle-scoring 
students (i.e., those between 400 and 600) generally cannot compete with the highest scoring 
students for the limited spots allocated by the centralized process. 
Next, we restrict the analysis sample to those students who did not enroll in a selective 
school. This subsample consists of 1,088 students who did not apply to any selective school (781 
respondents), to students who applied but were not offered a place in the selective system (159 
students), and to students who applied to and were accepted into the selective system but chose 
not to enroll (148 respondents). This represents 65 percent of the full sample. Restricting the 
sample in this way makes sense, because Table 5 gave no strong evidence of extensive margin 
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adjustments into selective schools. The fact that average baseline characteristics are balanced 
across treatment and control groups in this subsample (see Table 3, columns 5-8) further 
reassures us that restricting the sample in this way is reasonable. 
Table 6 examines how our information treatments impact extensive margin outcomes in 
the less selective school system. The only outcome we can measure here is whether a student 
chose to enroll in any less selective school by March 2014. To compare with Table 5, we show 
the control mean and treatment effect coefficients for any financial aid treatment in the first two 
columns. Over half of the control group enrolls in a less selective school, and while the 
coefficient on the Any financial aid treatment is positive and slightly larger than the similar 
coefficients in Table 5, it is not statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 split out 
the treatment effects into the effect of the financial aid only treatment and the effect of the 
financial aid in combination with returns treatment. We show the p value of the difference in 
these coefficients in column (5). Again, the MDE is large (0.109). We are unable to find any 
large impacts of the information treatment on the extensive margin of enrollment into less 
selective schools.28   
 
6.4. Effects of Information Treatments on Intensive Margins of Choice among Less Selective 
School Enrollees 
 
In Table 7, we provide evidence that our information treatments affected intensive margin 
choices among the subsample of students who were constrained to choose enrollment in schools 
in the less selective sector and who chose to enroll. We present control means in the first column, 
an estimate of the impact of Any financial aid treatment (Fi or Ri) in column (2), and then 
estimates of each of the financial aid only and the combined financial aid and returns treatments 
in columns (3) and (4). Under the assumption that the effects of each information treatment are 
additive, the difference between the two treatment effects tells us the impact of exposure to the 
returns treatment. The p value for this difference is given in column (5). The final two columns 
show the largest MDE associated with each of the separate ITT estimates and the sample size in 
each regression.  
We first check to see whether our treatments nudged students towards choosing schools 
suggested in the emails. We know the names of the schools suggested in each respondent’s 
                                                 
28 For each outcome, MDEs for each of the treatments differ in the third or higher decimal place. To be conservative 
and to save space, we report only the maximum of the MDEs across both treatments in Tables 6, 7 and 8. 
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returns treatment, and we can construct similar data for the other experimental groups who did 
not receive the returns treatment. We construct an indicator for whether the respondent enrolled 
in one of the schools that was (for the returns group) or would have been (for all other groups) 
suggested by the returns treatment. We construct another indicator that captures whether a 
student enrolls in a school that was (or would have been) suggested in the returns treatment and 
was of a higher quality than their preferred school at baseline. Recall, students did not know 
which quality tier the suggested schools came from, they only received a list of schools and 
associated average wages and employability.  
Panel A shows that our returns treatment in particular nudged students in the direction of 
enrolling in schools suggested in the treatment emails. Among control students, 61 percent 
would have enrolled in a less selective school that would have been a good match for them in the 
returns treatment. Exposure to our information treatments raises this share by 6 percentage 
points. Moreover, it is the returns treatment specifically that raises the share of students enrolled 
in a suggested school. Returns treatment students are also more likely to choose suggested 
schools of higher quality than their baseline preference, relative to the control group. The 
information about alternative schools seems to have stuck with students, despite low take-up 
rates. 
Panels B, C and D present further evidence that the information treatments changed the 
types of schools chosen by students constrained to the less selective sector. In Panel B, we show 
that the information treatment (overall) appears to move students away from private universities 
and towards professional schools, although these effects in column (2) are not statistically 
significantly different than zero. Splitting up the treatment effects, we see that the financial aid 
only treatment moves students towards professional institutes. One potential explanation for this 
is that the personalized information on decentralized financial aid provided more information 
about funding in professional institutes, and therefore opened up opportunities in these schools, 
relative to private universities.  
Panel C shows that exposure to both information treatments causes students to choose 
schools and careers offering around 9 percent lower expected average wages. They also tend to 
choose schools with lower average employability, although this effect is driven by the interaction 
of the returns and financial aid treatments. Results for tuition costs and duration of program in 
Panel D suggest that information treatment students choose shorter, cheaper programs, although 
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these estimates are not statistically significant at conventional levels. The signs of the impact 
estimates for the expected returns and cost of enrollment outcomes make sense, given that 
exposure to the information treatments caused students to change enrollment patterns away from 
private universities towards professional schools (Table 7, Panel B). Professional schools tend to 
offer shorter degree programs, and result in lower average wages compared with similar 
programs in universities. 
 
6.5 Who Was Nudged by the Information Treatments? 
 
To understand more about how information is working to cause these intensive margin shifts, we 
would like to know whether students with the greatest misperceptions about earnings, and those 
with the least information about financial aid opportunities, respond the most to our treatments. 
Unfortunately, because of high item non-response rates in our baseline survey, we do not have 
good data on baseline earnings expectations or loan and scholarship probabilities for all students 
in the subsample of less selective school enrollees. This means we cannot explore heterogeneous 
effects with respect to baseline expectations/information.  
To make some headway on this, we use the full sample of students to show that PSU 
score is highly correlated with non-response to the baseline question about expected earnings in 
one’s preferred career-school program (Appendix Figure 1). The PSU score is also correlated 
with the size of the gap between expected earnings and actual average earnings in a given 
school-career, for the sample of students who responded to the question (Appendix Figure 2). 
Therefore, we interpret PSU score as a proxy of how much information students have, with 
lower scores indicating less information. We split the sample of less selective school enrollees 
into above and below median PSU scores (median is 475), and estimate results for school choice 
in this sample for the high and low PSU scorers.  
Table 8 presents the results for outcomes describing whether students responded to the 
information nudge, and what type of school students enrolled in. Panel A shows results for the 
subsample of low PSU scorers, that is, those with the lowest quality information about earnings 
in their preferred career. Panel B shows the results for the subsample of high PSU scorers. We 
see immediately that the intensive margin effects on school choice within the less selective sector 
are driven by the low PSU scorers. Any financial aid treatment raises the chances of enrolling in 
a school suggested in the returns treatment by 12 percentage points, and although this is driven 
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by the returns treatment (column (4)), some of the effect is also coming from the financial aid 
alone treatment. This is most likely because the set of alternative schools and programs 
suggested in the returns treatment overlapped with decentralized sources of financial aid for 
schools and programs similar to student baseline preferences that were provided by PUC. The 
low PSU scorers are also the ones switching out of private universities and towards professional 
institutes, in response to our information treatments. Because most of the professional institutes 
and vocational schools have no PSU requirement, it makes sense that the low PSU scorers would 
be able to respond to the new information by changing their intensive margin choices. 
 
6.6 Discussion of Cost Effectiveness  
 
One of the innovations of our project was to test the impact of tailoring information to student 
preferences in a way that is easily scaled at low cost. The cost of our intervention had three 
components: the cost of collecting student contact details (emails) at baseline, along with their 
baseline school and career preferences; the cost of delivering the tailored returns information; 
and the cost of delivering the tailored financial aid information.  
The first cost would be incurred by any intervention seeking to deliver information via 
email.29 The cost of the returns treatment consisted of a fixed cost of designing an algorithm that 
uses publicly available data to provide the tailored information treatment, and a variable cost of 
delivering this information. In our experiment, the former amounted to 2.68USD per treated 
student while the latter was basically zero. The cost of the financial aid treatment also had two 
components. There was a fixed cost associated with building and updating a database of 
decentralized financial aid opportunities. Like the fixed costs of the returns treatment, this cost 
would become negligible the more students are included in the intervention. The only variable 
cost that is relevant is the cost of compensating workers to match student preferences with 
financial aid opportunities and send the personalized emails. The NGO used volunteers to 
perform this task. We compute an upper bound for the cost of employing recent high school 
graduates to perform this task. Assuming that it takes a worker 30 minutes to search the database 
on decentralized financial aid to find matches with student preferences and populate an email 
template with this information, the cost per treated student would be 1.5USD (using the average 
wage of recent high school graduates).    
                                                 
29 In our case, this was done through student career fairs and cost 1.8USD per student. In other settings, this cost 
would be incurred by a government collecting student contact details through, for example, a loan application form.  
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Overall, relative to other interventions that distribute only general information via email, 
the cost of personalizing returns information is low, as long as there is a public database on 
wages and employment outcomes for schools and careers. The cost of personalizing financial aid 
information is somewhat higher since it requires labor to tailor the information to students.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We designed our project to test whether an inexpensive and scalable information intervention 
could improve access to higher education and affect enrollment choices made by students in an 
education system with both selective and less selective schools. Two main findings emerge in 
our analysis. First, we find no evidence that providing tailored information about financial aid 
and returns to students at the end of high school changes decisions about application or 
enrollment to higher education. There are no meaningful extensive margin effects in either the 
selective system or the less selective system. Second, we find the information treatments 
changed the types and characteristics of the less selective schools in which students enroll. 
Treated respondents shift out of private universities, towards professional schools, with students 
significantly more likely to choose to enroll in institutions suggested in the returns treatment. We 
provide suggestive evidence that the information treatments (specifically, the returns treatment) 
changed school choice behavior the most for students with the worst quality information on 
average returns at baseline.  
These intensive margin changes have ambiguous implications for student welfare. While 
we might be concerned that a shift into programs and schools offering lower wages and 
employability would reduce student welfare, a shift towards shorter programs that charge lower 
tuition could have positive or negative effects on predicted net returns. This is even more likely 
to be the case if treated students were able to access private sources of financial aid at higher 
rates because of the financial aid treatment, an outcome we are unable to measure because it does 
not exist in any centralized administrative dataset. Without better data, we are unable to make 
general statements about the welfare effects of this information intervention.  
Despite the problems with statistical power that we face given our small sample size and 
low take-up rates, this experiment adds to what we know about how information about higher 
education affects individual choices and outcomes in settings where two tiers of higher education 
coexist. The insights we generate may be important in many countries where the supply of less 
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selective institutions of higher education has recently grown and where there is great 
heterogeneity in the quality of these institutions. Governments could still play a role in providing 
inexpensive and targeted information interventions to help marginal students better understand 
quality gradients and cost-benefit trade-offs in schools in the less selective sector.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Summary of Financial Aid Treatment Information for a Given Career Preference 
 
Note: Table shows information provided in the financial aid treatment. Specific information is tailored to student 
career-school preferences at baseline. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of Returns Treatment Information for a Given Career Preference 
 
 
Note: Table shows information provided in the returns treatment based on student career-school preferences at 
baseline. X is the first choice preferred school at baseline. Quality tiers are defined over each of the selective and 
less selective systems, by grouping years of government accreditation into three roughly equal bins. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Types of Financial Aid Information Description of information provided
General
Links to application for central government financial aid 
(scholarships and loans) and YouTube video on how to 
complete
Specific: Loans
Links to other loan programs for which a student is eligible 
based on socio-economic status and expected PSU score. 
More than one link may have been provided.
Specific: Private scholarships offered by an institution 
for specific expenses (fees, boarding etc)
Links to scholarships from student’s preferred institution and 
one other related institution 
Specific: Private scholarships for certain careers
Links to up to two different scholarships targeted towards 
student’s preferred career (may or may not be linked to a 
school)
Specific: Private scholarships (foundations and 
municipalities) for students meeting eligibility criteria
Links to any private scholarships for students meeting 
eligibility criteria e.g. age, duration of degree program, first or 
second year student, living in a particular municipality
School type Quality tier of school Mean earnings, employability given for:
Student preferred school: X (if listed) Quality tier of X (high/medium/low) X if preference given; else nothing 
Selective school Same quality tier as X/highest quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools 
Selective school Lower quality tier than X/medium quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools 
Less selective school Same quality tier as X/highest quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools 
Less selective school Lower quality tier as X/medium quality tier if no X List of up to 3 schools 
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Table 3. Baseline Balance 
 
 
Note: Variables in this table were collected from students at career fairs and from the online survey administered at 
baseline. Selective school is defined as a school belonging to the DEMRE group, for which application must be 
made through the centralized application system. PSU is the college entry examination. All balance regressions 
contain stratum fixed effects. Missing values are balanced across experimental group. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 indicate statistically significant differences. 
 
 
  
Control 
Mean 
[s.d]
Financial Aid 
Treatment
Financial Aid plus 
Returns Treatment N
Control 
Mean 
[s.d]
Financial Aid 
Treatment
Financial Aid plus 
Returns Treatment N
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Age 17.576 0.040 -0.042 1,665 17.665 0.118 0.012 1,085
[1.574] [0.105] [0.098] [1.609] [0.147] [0.137]
Self-reported poor status 0.199 0.019 0.016 1,513 0.231 0.017 0.032 972
[0.400] [0.025] [0.025] [0.422] [0.033] [0.034]
% poor in municipality in 2009 12.132 -0.052 -0.103 1,520 12.479 0.028 0.032 1,021
[4.988] [0.309] [0.309] [5.007] [0.370] [0.398]
Panel B: Academics and Grades
Final high school grade, expected 58.089 0.150 -0.186 1,463 56.549 0.245 -0.070 929
[4.536] [0.290] [0.288] [4.043] [0.337] [0.332]
PSU Math and Language, expected 589.423 -5.373 2.567 1,389 557.635 -11.468 3.475 869
[96.707] [6.492] [6.210] [93.895] [8.138] [7.995]
Will take the PSU 0.945 -0.012 -0.006 1,534 0.936 -0.019 -0.014 989
[0.229] [0.015] [0.015] [0.245] [0.020] [0.020]
Prepare for PSU > 6 months 0.076 0.015 0.027 1,426 0.056 -0.003 0.019 901
[0.265] [0.018] [0.018] [0.230] [0.018] [0.020]
Panel C: Baseline Preferences and Expectations
At least one selective school listed 0.759 -0.018 -0.016 1,298 0.639 -0.052 -0.041 817
[0.428] [0.029] [0.029] [0.481] [0.041] [0.040]
At least one less selective school listed 0.928 -0.015 0.017 1,298 0.964 -0.011 0.019 817
[0.259] [0.018] [0.016] [0.187] [0.017] [0.014]
Probability get a state or private scholarship (%) 58.946 0.979 2.622 1,331 56.129 -0.863 4.204* 831
[26.829] [1.828] [1.799] [26.013] [2.279] [2.237]
Without a scholarship, I will study using a loan 0.559 0.000 -0.009 1,366 0.512 0.011 0.000 856
[0.497] [0.033] [0.033] [0.501] [0.041] [0.042]
Without a scholarship, I will postpone 0.190 0.018 -0.008 1,366 0.235 0.005 -0.023 856
[0.393] [0.026] [0.026] [0.425] [0.035] [0.035]
Without a scholarship, I do not know what I will do 0.236 -0.021 0.013 1,366 0.239 -0.029 0.010 856
[0.425] [0.028] [0.028] [0.427] [0.035] [0.036]
Probability of being employed after study (%) 73.314 -1.768 -1.421 789 69.164 -1.192 0.187 486
[23.829] [2.198] [2.155] [25.713] [2.933] [2.828]
Average expected wage: $200K to $600K 0.259 -0.004 -0.002 816 0.351 -0.033 -0.026 507
[0.439] [0.038] [0.037] [0.479] [0.051] [0.052]
Average expected wage: over $600K 0.741 0.004 0.002 816 0.649 0.033 0.026 507
[0.439] [0.038] [0.037] [0.479] [0.051] [0.052]
Whole Sample Sub-sample excluding selective school enrollees
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Table 4. Treatment Compliance and Take-Up 
 
 
Note: We are able to verify whether financial aid emails bounced or not, and whether any students replied to the 
email sent by PUC. We can verify whether returns emails were opened at all, since we administered the treatment 
from a single University of Chile email address.  
  
 
 
Table 5. Extensive Margin Impacts on Access to Selective Schools  
(whole sample) 
 
 
Note: All regressions include stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). The set of 
controls include baseline variables: expected PSU score and high school GPA. MDE is the 
minimum detectable effect size for each outcome, given sample design. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
  
Emails Sent Emails did
not bounce
Emails
received and 
answered
Emails Sent Emails 
Opened
Control 556 8 8 0 4 2
[1.44%] [1.44%] [0%] [0.72%] [0.36%]
Financial Aid Treatment 553 548 547 60 3 2
[99.10%] [98.92%] [10.85%] [0.54%] [0.36%]
Financial Aid and Returns Treatment 559 556 553 79 539 301
[99.46%] [98.93%] [14.13%] [96.42%] [53.85%]
Financial Aid Treatment Returns Treatment
Experimental group N
Control 
mean        
[s.d]
Any Financial
Aid Treatment
MDE N
Applied to selective school 0.522 0.015 0.07 1,668
[0.500] [0.022]
Accepted into selective school 0.412 0.018 0.07 1,668
[0.493] [0.022]
Enrolled in selective school 0.340 0.018 0.08 1,668
[0.474] [0.021]
 32 
Table 6. Extensive Margin Impacts on Access to Less Selective Schools 
(sub-sample of students not enrolled in selected schools) 
 
 
Note: The regression includes stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents 
coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) present coefficients for the separate treatments. The set 
of controls include baseline variables: expected PSU score and high school GPA. MDE is the minimum detectable 
effect size for each outcome, given sample design. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, 
*p<0.1. 
 
Table 7. Intensive Margin Impacts of Exposure to Information Treatments  
(sub-sample of enrollees in less selective schools) 
 
 
Note: All regressions include stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents 
coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) present coefficients for the separate treatments. The set 
of controls include different baseline variables: expected PSU score and high school GPA. MDE is the minimum 
detectable effect size for each outcome, given sample design. In this case, MDE is the maximum MDE across both 
treatments; MDEs only differ in the third or higher decimal place for each outcome. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.  
Control 
mean      
[s.d]
Any 
financial aid 
treatment
Financial 
Aid
Only
Treatment
Financial 
Aid
plus Returns
p-value of 
difference in 
treatment 
coefficients
MDE N
Enrolled in less selective school 0.556 0.037 0.045 0.029 0.652 0.109 1,088
[0.498] [0.032] [0.037] [0.036]
Control 
mean 
[s.d]
Any 
financial 
aid 
treatment
Financial 
Aid
Only
Treatment
Financial 
Aid
plus 
Returns
p-value of 
difference in 
treatment 
coefficients
MDE N
Panel A: Nudge effects - enrolled in a school that would have been:
Suggested by Returns Treatment 0.113 0.059** 0.035 0.083** 0.196 0.092 626
[0.317] [0.029] [0.034] [0.036]
Suggested by Returns Treatment, and higher quality 0.618 0.060 0.021 0.099** 0.082 0.141 626
 than student's baseline preference [0.487] [0.040] [0.047] [0.046]
Panel B: Type of school
Private University 0.358 -0.062 -0.058 -0.066 0.857 0.140 626
[0.481] [0.038] [0.044] [0.044]
Professional Institute 0.441 0.064 0.088* 0.04 0.327 0.145 626
[0.498] [0.042] [0.048] [0.049]
Vocational training school 0.201 -0.002 -0.03 0.026 0.149 0.117 626
[0.402] [0.034] [0.039] [0.040]
Panel C: Measures of returns for enrollment outcomes
Log of wage bracket (midpoint) 13.325 -0.091*** -0.094** -0.088** 0.875 0.126 624
[0.434] [0.035] [0.041] [0.040]
Average employability 0.842 -0.011 -0.004 -0.018* 0.146 0.029 622
[0.099] [0.008] [0.009] [0.010]
Years the program-career has existed 4.315 0.064 -0.002 0.129 0.449 0.512 624
[1.760] [0.148] [0.169] [0.174]
Panel D: Cost of enrollment outcomes
Log annual tuition 14.265 -0.026 -0.032 -0.019 0.719 0.110 624
[0.379] [0.031] [0.037] [0.035]
Semesters duration 7.089 -0.157 -0.104 -0.211 0.631 0.663 624
[2.278] [0.188] [0.220] [0.217]
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Table 8. Heterogeneity in Intensive Margin Impacts 
(sub-sample of enrollees in less selective schools) 
 
 
Note: All regressions include stratum fixed effects (for gender and parental education). Column (2) presents 
coefficients from the pooled treatment; columns (3) and (4) present coefficients for the separate treatments. The set 
of controls include different baseline variables: expected PSU score and high school GPA. MDE is the minimum 
detectable effect size for each outcome, given sample design. In this case, MDE is the maximum MDE across both 
treatments; MDEs only differ in the third or higher decimal place for each outcome. Indices are the average of 
standardized variables in each group defined over the complete sample. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Control 
mean 
[s.d]
Any 
financial 
aid 
treatmen
Financial 
Aid
Only
Treatment
Financial 
Aid
plus 
Returns
p value of 
difference in 
treatment 
coefficients
MDE N
Panel A:  Low PSU <475 
Enrolled in school that would have been 0.048 0.121*** 0.093** 0.150*** 0.277 0.094 287
        suggested by Returns treatment [0.214] [0.037] [0.044] [0.047]
Enrolled in school that would have been 0.643 0.102* 0.064 0.140** 0.226 0.213 287
suggested in Returns Treatment; higher quality [0.482] [0.062] [0.070] [0.068]
Private University 0.226 -0.070 -0.046 -0.094* 0.378 0.186 287
[0.421] [0.052] [0.061] [0.056]
Professional Institute 0.500 0.116* 0.148** 0.083 0.358 0.222 287
[0.503] [0.065] [0.074] [0.074]
Vocational training school 0.274 -0.046 -0.101 0.010 0.063 0.198 287
[0.449] [0.059] [0.064] [0.068]
Panel B:  High PSU >475
Enrolled in institution that would have been 0.149 0.053 0.046 0.060 0.819 0.148 295
suggested in Returns Treatment [0.358] [0.047] [0.057] [0.056]
Enrolled in school that would have been 0.608 0.008 -0.041 0.058 0.167 0.202 295
suggested in Returns Treatment; higher quality [0.491] [0.059] [0.069] [0.069]
Private University 0.467 -0.002 -0.012 0.009 0.778 0.206 295
[0.501] [0.060] [0.069] [0.071]
Professional Institute 0.383 0.028 0.058 -0.001 0.409 0.201 295
[0.488] [0.058] [0.068] [0.069]
Vocational training school 0.149 -0.027 -0.046 -0.007 0.410 0.148 295
[0.358] [0.042] [0.047] [0.049]
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Figures 
Figure 1. PSU Scores in the Control Group 
 
 
Note: PSU is the college entry examination. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Enrollment Choices by PSU Score, Control Froup 
 
 
Note: PSU is the college entry examination. 
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Figure 3. Timeline of Treatments Relative to Applications Deadlines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Solid lines represent times during which students could take actions (e.g. to apply for scholarships, to apply or 
enroll in a higher education institution). Dotted lines represent times in which students could take actions but in 
which this action was unlikely to happened. For instance, in late December students have just finished high school 
and have not learned yet their PSU results or the results from the first round of scholarships run by the central 
government. It is therefore unlikely that they have already applied to a less selective institution. Dashed lines 
represent waiting times. 
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Appendix 1. Email Text for Por Una Carrera (financial aid) Treatment 
 
Subject Scholarship Counselling  [Asesoría Beca ] <Replace student’s name> 
Introduction 
 
Hello [Hola] <Replace name>,  
 
I am <Replace advisor name> and I am giving advice to the people that have been signed up 
for the personalized advice of Por una Carrera institution.  
 
[Soy <…> y estoy asesorando a las personas que se han inscrito en el asesoramiento 
personalizado de la Fundación por una Carrera.] 
 
Preferences 
According to the preferences registered, I can see that you would like to study <Replace 
career 1>  or <Replace career 2> at <Replace institution 1> or  <Replace institution 2> 
 
[Según tus preferencias inscritas, puedo ver que te gustaría estudiar <…>  o <…> en  la <…> 
o en la <…>] 
State Scholarships  
 
In order to apply for the state scholarships, you should fill in the online form FUAS (Unique 
form for socioeconomic certificate) that you can find at www.becasycreditos.cl. 
 
[Para postular a las becas estatales, deberás rellenar el formulario online FUAS (Formulario 
Único de Acreditación Socioeconómica) que lo encontrarás en la página 
www.becasycreditos.cl] 
 
When you fill in this form you are automatically applying to all the state scholarships and 
loans. If you are on your first year you must sent the form before 27st November. 
 
[Al rellenar este formulario estarás automáticamente postulando a todas las becas y créditos 
estatales. Si eres alumno de primero año, tienes hasta el día 27 de noviembre para enviar el 
formulario.] 
 
According to your profile you could also apply to the following scholarships or loans. 
[Según tus antecedentes, podrías optar a las siguientes becas y créditos:] 
 
<Replace with the list of scholarships according the socioeconomic situation > 
 
See this video that would help you to fill in FUAS form. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpReXzlwkcA 
 
[Revisa el siguiente video que te ayudará a completar el FUAS 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LpReXzlwkcA] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real fee and reference fee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All the careers have a Real Fee and a Reference Fee. The Real Fee is the amount that you 
should pay by year for certain career. The Reference Fee is the maximum amount fee for 
each career and institution that the State can sponsor with either scholarships or loans.  
 
[Debes saber, que toda carrera tiene un Arancel Real y uno de Referencia. El Arancel Real 
corresponde a lo que debes pagar al año por una determinada carrera. El Arancel de 
Referencia es el monto máximo del arancel de cada carrera e institución que el Estado puede 
financiar, ya sea a través de becas o créditos.]  
 
As you can see there will be always a difference amongst these fees. Thus, it is important that 
you also look for other private scholarships. Following we are recommending to you some 
private scholarships 
 
[Como puedes ver siempre habrá una diferencia entre ambos aranceles, por lo que es 
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 fundamental que también busques becas privadas como las que te recomendaremos a 
continuación.] 
 
Private 
Scholarships 
Institution 
Scholarships 
 
After seeing your particular characteristics, there are some scholarships that  can be useful to 
you besides the state scholarships 
 
[Después de ver tus características hay becas que te pueden servir, además de las que entrega 
el Estado.] 
 
<Replace Institution 1> 
Fee Scholarships [Becas de Arancel] 
 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s descripton> 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s descripton> 
 
Complementary Scholarships [Becas Complementarias] 
<Replace scholarship’s name>:  
<Ex. Food, Sports, other agreements (firms, accidents), etc)  
For more Information about these scholarships look: <Replace link> 
[Para mayor informacion sobre estas becas, visita: <…>] 
 
<Replace Institution 2> 
Fee Scholarships [Becas de Arancel] 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s description> 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s description> 
 
Complementary Scholarships [Becas Complementarias] 
<Replace scholarship’s name>:  
<Ex. Food, Sports, other agreements (firms, accidents), etc)  
 
For more Information about these scholarships look: <Replace link> 
[Para mayor informacion sobre estas becas, visita: <…>] 
If there are no scholarships for the institution 
[The <Replace institution> does not have specific scholarships for you] 
 
Career 
Scholarship 
 
There is also a special/specific scholarship for your career. 
[También existe una Beca específica para tu carrera.] 
 
<Replace career 1> 
<Replace scholarship’s name> “Specific for [Especifa para] <Replace University>” 
<Replace scholarship’s description> 
 
<Replace career 2> 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s description> 
 
[If this scholarship is specific for a university, please indicate it as it is shown above] 
[Si la beca es especifica para una universidad, señalarlo como se muestra arriba] 
 
Other 
Scholarships 
(foundation) 
 
Scholarship Fundación Puente: [Beca Fundación Puente:] 
 
Requirements to get a scholarship from Fundacion Puente: being a student of High Education 
at some institution in the Metropolitan Area (State Universities, Private Universities, 
Professional Institution, Technical Center). It does not matter if the student comes from 
another city outside the Metropolitan Area. Your career must be at least 2 years in duration 
and you can be in your first or second year. You must be between 17 and 24 years old. It is 
not a requirement to practice or be part of a particular religion. You should be willing to 
participate in the formation activities and the accompaniment of Fundacion Puente (For more 
information look www.fundacionpuente.cl/actividades.php) 
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[Requisitos para ser un becado de Fundación Puente: Ser estudiante de Educación Superior 
en alguna institución de la Región Metropolitana (Universidades Estatales, Universidades 
Privadas, Institutos Profesionales y Centros de Formación Técnica), sin perjuicio de que el 
postulante tenga su ciudad de origen fuera de la misma. Estudiar una carrera con 2 años de 
duración como mínimo. Encontrarse cursando primer o segundo año de su carrera. Tener 
entre 17 y 24 años de edad. No es requisito pertenecer o profesar una religión en particular. 
Estar dispuesto a participar en las actividades de Formación y Acompañamiento de la 
FundaciónPuente (para mayor información visitar p 
http://www.fundacionpuente.cl/programa_becas.php )] 
 
Municipality 
Scholarship 
  
If you are still living at <Replace Comuna> it is important that you know that the 
municipality can give you the following scholarships:  
 
[Si sigues viviendo en la comuna <…> es importante que sepas que la municipalidad te 
puede entregar las siguientes becas:] 
 
<Replace scholarship’s name>: <Replace scholarship’s description> 
 
 [OR: The municipality  < Replace Comuna > does not give scholarships] 
[O: La municipalidad de <Reemplazar Comuna de Residencia> no entrega becas.] 
 
Good-bye 
 
 
 
 
Please, I ask you that you answer this email to know that you have receive it. 
[Te pido por favor que me contestes este mail para saber que lo recibiste.] 
 
It is important to us to know that we are in contact with you. Remember that you are the only 
one in charge of your application process. We are only giving to you the different financial 
options that exist. 
[Es muy importante para nosotros saber que estamos en contacto contigo. Recuerda que el 
encargado del proceso de postulación eres TÚ, nosotros solo te informamos las distintas 
opciones de financiamiento existentes.] 
 
You can find additional information that would help you guiding your decision at the page 
www.eligecarrera.cl.  
[Puedes encontrar información adicional para orientar tu decisión en la página 
www.eligecarrera.cl.] 
 
If you have any doubts please let me know. 
[Si tienes alguna duda no dudes en escribirme.] 
 
Best,  
[Saludos,] 
<Replace Advisor’s name>  
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Appendix 2. Email Text for Returns Treatment 
 
First page 
Title Do  you know? 
¿SABES? 
Subtitle In this page you could find important information to decide what to study 
En esta página podrás encontrar información importante para decidir qué estudiar. 
INFORMATION 
Headline MONDAY 18TH, NOVEMBER, 2013 
Who much could I earn if I study …? 
Will I be working after finish my degree? 
 
LUNES 18, NOVIEMBRE, 2013 
¿Cuánto podría ganar si estudio … ? 
¿Estaré trabajando al salir de la carrera?  
 
Introduction  Dear <name of the student> 
Taking into account your preference about career and institutions, we present you the 
income and the employability of your preference and other similar options in different 
institutions. 
 
Estimado <nombre alumno>: 
Considerando la carrera de tu preferencia, a continuación te presentamos el ingreso y la 
empleabilidad de ésta, y otras similares, en distintas instituciones. 
TABLE <List and options> 
Example For instance, for the case of the first career the average salary <years after> years after of 
graduation is <salary>. The <%> of the students of this career were working the second 
year after graduation 
Por ejemplo, en el caso de primera carrera el salario promedio <núm. año> después de la 
titulación es <salario>. El <%> de los alumnos de esta carrera se encontraban trabajando 
el segundo año luego de egresar. 
Questions Do you think that this is a good option? 
Did any of the alternatives draw your attention?  
These and other questions you must ask yourself before deciding about your professional 
future. 
¿Te parece una buena opción? 
¿Alguna de las alternativas, llamó tu atención? 
Estas y otras preguntas debes hacerte antes de decidir sobre tu futuro educacional 
Nota 1 The income data associated with an institutions correspond to the fourth year after 
graduation. 
Los datos de ingreso asociado a una institución corresponden al cuarto año después de 
egreso. 
 
 
Second page 
Title How did we generate and get the information that we give? 
¿Cómo generamos y cómo obtuvimos la información que te entregamos? 
Illustration 
Ilustración: mono de pregunta 
Information 
Text What did we do? 
 We classified the careers according the accreditation years. That way we got 3 
quality groups: high (+year), medium and low (- year). 
 
How did we select the career within the same quality group? 
 We selected the career with the best average salaries. 
 If two career have the same salary, we broke the ties taking into account: lower 
tuition and fees, high employability and, if none of this criteria worked we 
chose randomly. 
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What information do we send? And why this information? 
 If we know the what career and in what the intuition you want to study, we give 
you the available information about your preference and about institutions with 
similar quality that teach your career. 
 If we know what degree you want to study but no the institution, we give you 
information about your career in high and medium quality institution. 
 If we know only know the subarea in which you want to study, we give you 
information about careers within this subarea in high and medium quality 
institution. 
 If we know only know the area in which you want to study, we give you 
information about careers within this area in high and medium quality 
institution. 
 If we know nothing about your preferences, we give you information about the 
area with the best return and the careers taught in high and medium quality 
institutions within this area. 
 
¿Qué hicimos? 
 Clasificamos las carreras según años de acreditación. Así obtuvimos 3 grupos 
de calidad: alta (+ años), media y baja (- años). 
¿Cómo seleccionamos carreras dentro del mismo grupo de calidad? 
 Seleccionamos las carreras con mejor salario promedio. 
 Si dos carreras tienen igual salario, desempatamos considerando: menor 
arancel, menor costo de matrícula, mayor empleabilidad y, si ninguno de estos 
criterios desempataba, elegimos al azar.  
¿Qué información te entregamos? ¿Y por qué esa información? 
 Si sabemos qué carrera y en que institución quieres estudiar, te entregamos la 
información de la que disponemos sobre tu preferencia y sobre instituciones de 
calidad similar que impartan tu carrera. 
 Si sabemos qué carrera quieres estudiar, pero no la institución, te entregamos 
información sobre la carrera en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media. 
 Si sabemos solo en que subárea quieres estudiar, te entregamos información 
sobre carreras de la subárea en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media. 
 Si sabemos sólo en qué  área quieres estudiar, te entregamos información sobre 
carreras del área en instituciones de calidad alta y calidad media. 
 Si no sabemos nada sobre tus preferencias, te entregamos información sobre el 
área de mejor retorno y de carreras impartidas por instituciones de calidad alta 
y calidad media en esta área. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1. Comparing Experimental Sample to Larger Population of Students 
 
 
Note: Sample consists of students signing up for more information through Por Una Carrera’s 
booth at career fairs across Chile. Experimental sample consists of those who responded to our 
online survey at baseline. N varies across variables due to missing responses. p values are from 
regressions of each variable on baseline response dummy with robust standard errors. Other 
careers include art and architecture, humanities, natural sciences, agriculture and veterinary 
careers. DEMRE schools are schools in the selective system. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
N
Mean of
baseline
survey 
nonresponders
Mean of
baseline
survey
responders
Difference in
means
p  value
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Expected high school GPA: Range 40-70 10,198 56.721 57.856 1.135*** 0.000
[4.504] [4.348] [0.118]
Expected PSU score: Range 150-800 7,736 575.834 584.976 9.141*** 0.000
[81.925] [75.492] [2.267]
Self-reported poor indicator 10,223 0.247 0.242 -0.005 0.666
[0.431] [0.428] [0.012]
% poor in municipality in 2009 9,853 12.399 12.069 -0.330** 0.017
[4.938] [4.940] [0.138]
Panel B: Student Preferences
Management and Business 9,890 0.168 0.170 0.002 0.854
[0.374] [0.376] [0.010]
Technology 9,890 0.219 0.207 -0.011 0.322
[0.413] [0.406] [0.011]
Health Sciences 9,890 0.282 0.303 0.021* 0.092
[0.450] [0.460] [0.013]
Social Sciences, Law & Teaching 9,890 0.197 0.205 0.008 0.488
[0.398] [0.404] [0.011]
Others 9,890 0.135 0.115 -0.020** 0.027
[0.341] [0.319] [0.009]
Baseline school preference DEMRE 10,464 0.502 0.622 0.120*** 0.000
[0.500] [0.485] [0.013]
Baseline school preference no DEMRE 10,464 0.412 0.347 -0.065*** 0.000
[0.492] [0.476] [0.013]
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Appendix Table 2. Comparing Experimental Sample to Universe of PSU Takers 
 
 
Note: Sample consists of students signing up for more information through Por Una Carrera’s booth at career fairs 
across Chile. Experimental sample consists of those who responded to our online survey at baseline. N varies across 
variables due to missing responses. p values are from regressions of each variable on baseline response dummy with 
robust standard errors. Other careers include art and architecture, humanities, natural sciences, agriculture and 
veterinary careers. DEMRE schools are schools in the selective system. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
Appendix Table 3. Administrative Data for Experimental Sample 
 
 
Note: Total experimental sample size is 1,668. Selective school is defined as a school belonging to the DEMRE 
group, for which application must be made through the centralized application system. Financial aid may include the 
receipt of both scholarships and loans.  
N
Mean of
PSU 
takers
Mean of 
sample
Difference in
means p  value
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Gender 243,657 0.471 0.318 -0.153*** 0.000
[0.499] [0.466] [0.012]
School GPA 211,502 55.979 57.235 1.256*** 0.000
[4.880] [4.765] [0.122]
Father with tertiary education 243,657 0.248 0.243 -0.005 0.630
[0.432] [0.429] [0.011]
Mother with tertiary education 243,657 0.257 0.254 -0.004 0.741
[0.437] [0.435] [0.011]
Household income more than 288K 243,657 0.557 0.595 0.038*** 0.002
[0.497] [0.491] [0.012]
N. with 
characteristic
N. eligible 
sample %
Has PSU score 1,602 1,668 96.04
Applied to a selective school 879 1,668 52.70
Enrolled in any higher education 1,206 1,668 72.30
Enrolled in Selective School
     Public university 275 1,206 22.80
     Public-Private university 95 1,206 7.88
     Private university 210 1,206 17.41
Enrolled in Less Selective school
     Private university 204 1,206 16.92
     IP institution (professional school) 298 1,206 22.80
     CFT institution (vocational school) 124 1,206 10.28
Successfully obtained government financial aid
     Government Scholarship 717 1,206 59.45
     Government Loan 515 1,206 42.70
Treatment assignments
   Any Information Treatment 1,112 1,668 66.67
     Financial Aid Treatment 553 1,668 33.15
     Financial Aid plus Returns Treatment 559 1,668 33.51
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Appendix Table 4. Balance of Missing Data from Baseline Survey 
 
 
      Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Control Financial Aid 
Treatment
Financial Aid 
plus Returns 
treatment
N
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Age 1.000 -0.004 -0.002 1,668
[0.000] [0.003] [0.002]
Self-reported poor status 0.914 -0.005 -0.014 1,668
[0.281] [0.017] [0.017]
Community poverty rate 2009 (%) 0.906 0.004 0.012 1,668
[0.291] [0.017] [0.017]
Panel B: Academic and Grades
Final high school grade, expected 0.869 0.010 0.022 1,668
[0.338] [0.014] [0.014]
PSU Math and Languages, expected 0.826 0.006 0.021 1,668
[0.380] [0.019] [0.019]
Will take the PSU 0.912 0.016 0.012 1,668
[0.284] [0.013] [0.013]
Hours per week prepare: more than 4 hours 0.854 0.001 0.006 1,668
[0.353] [0.018] [0.018]
Panel C: Preferences and Expectations
Any school preferences 0.775 -0.008 0.017 1,668
[0.418] [0.025] [0.025]
Probability you get a private scholarship (%) 0.784 0.013 -0.008 1,668
[0.412] [0.013] [0.014]
Probability you get a private scholarship (%) 0.725 0.002 0.004 1,668
[0.447] [0.019] [0.019]
Without a scholarship, What will you do? 0.824 -0.002 -0.001 1,668
[0.381] [0.008] [0.008]
Probability of being employed after study (%) 0.475 -0.021 0.020 1,668
[0.500] [0.028] [0.028]
Average expected wage 0.493 -0.014 0.007 1,668
[0.500] [0.028] [0.028]
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Appendix Table 5. Balance in Subsample of Students Considering Less Selective Schools 
 
 
Notes: Variables in this table were collected from students at career fairs and from the online 
survey administered at baseline. Restricted sample refers to the set of students who did not apply 
to selective schools or who were not enrolled into any selective school. Selective school is defined 
as a school belonging to the DEMRE group, for which application must be made through the 
centralized application system. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
  
Control 
Mean [s.d]
Financial 
Aid 
Treatment
Financial Aid 
plus Returns 
Treatment
N
Panel A: Student Characteristics
Age 17.588 -0.124 -0.086 624
[1.451] [0.112] [0.114]
Self-reported poor status 0.253 -0.011 -0.011 561
[0.436] [0.044] [0.045]
% poor in municipality in 2009 12.272 0.330 0.312 579
[4.992] [0.467] [0.519]
Panel B: Academics and Grades
Final high school grade, expected 56.054 0.752* -0.075 525
[3.916] [0.441] [0.432]
PSU Math and Languages, expected 545.597 -3.599 3.237 494
[87.391] [9.972] [10.220]
Will take the PSU 0.927 -0.005 -0.012 567
[0.260] [0.027] [0.028]
Prepare for PSU > 6 months 0.061 0.011 0.021 512
[0.241] [0.027] [0.028]
Panel C: Baseline Preferences and Expectations
At least one selective school listed 0.580 -0.054 -0.076 472
[0.495] [0.055] [0.055]
At least one less selective school listed 0.960 0.009 0.024 472
[0.197] [0.021] [0.019]
Probability get a state or private scholarship (%) 56.060 0.803 5.392* 475
[24.741] [2.945] [2.937]
Without a scholarship, I will study using a loan 0.601 -0.025 -0.070 485
[0.491] [0.056] [0.056]
Without a scholarship, I will postpone 0.157 0.030 0.026 485
[0.365] [0.042] [0.042]
Without a scholarship, I will not study 0.020 0.002 0.001 485
[0.139] [0.016] [0.015]
Without a scholarship, I do not know what I will d 0.222 -0.007 0.043 485
[0.417] [0.047] [0.049]
Probability of being employed after study (%) 69.848 -3.500 -1.910 277
[24.755] [3.722] [3.708]
Average expected wage: $200K to $600K 0.330 0.031 0.012 291
[0.473] [0.068] [0.069]
Average expected wage: over $600K 0.670 -0.031 -0.012 291
[0.473] [0.068] [0.069]
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Appendix Figure 1. Correlation between PSU Score 
and Expected Wage Misinformation at Baseline 
 
 
Note: The figure plots quantiles of the PSU distribution on the x-axis and share of individuals that did not report 
expected wage (left figure) or the average gap between expected wage and average wage for preferred career as 
reported in MiFuturo. Solid lines are non-parametric regressions.  
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